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Learning and monetary policy
￿ Rational expectations is a cornerstone of modern
macroeconomic theory.
￿ Rational expectations equilibrium is at the heart of the
learning literature.
￿ But rational expectations is not a practical assumption.
￿ Actual private sector expectations are unlikely to be
precisely consistent with REE.
￿ That is still all right ...
￿ ... so long as small expectational deviations from RE
dissipate, instead of accumulating.
￿ That condition is known as expectational stability.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
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What the literature has shown
￿ REE may or may not be expectationally stable in New
Keynesian models.
￿ In the simplest New Keynesian model, the Taylor Principle
is associated with E-stability.
￿ Failure of the Taylor Principle is associated with
expectational instability.
￿ That result assumes
￿ contemporaneous data speciﬁcation of the policy rule.
￿ decreasing gain in the learning rule.
￿ Comforting.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
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What the authors do
￿ Instrument rules plus various forms of “optimal” policy.
￿ Replace decreasing gain with constant gain.
￿ Agents are trying to robustly track the changing
environment in which they operate.
￿ Concentrate on operational rules in the sense of McCallum.
￿ Keep policymaker information in line with reality.
￿ In particular, contemporaneous values of output and
inﬂation are not known when policy decisions are made.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
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Main ﬁndings
￿ There are many recommended good or “optimal” policies
for this model ...
￿ ... but most produce expectational instability in this setting.
￿ Policymakers following these recommended approaches in
this environment would be surprised to ﬁnd that the
economy does not coordinate on the intended equilibrium.
￿ To obtain expectational stability, use the
expectations-based rules of Evans-Honkapohja (2003,
2006).Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
Main ﬁndings
￿ There are many recommended good or “optimal” policies
for this model ...
￿ ... but most produce expectational instability in this setting.
￿ Policymakers following these recommended approaches in
this environment would be surprised to ﬁnd that the
economy does not coordinate on the intended equilibrium.
￿ To obtain expectational stability, use the
expectations-based rules of Evans-Honkapohja (2003,
2006).Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
Main ﬁndings
￿ There are many recommended good or “optimal” policies
for this model ...
￿ ... but most produce expectational instability in this setting.
￿ Policymakers following these recommended approaches in
this environment would be surprised to ﬁnd that the
economy does not coordinate on the intended equilibrium.
￿ To obtain expectational stability, use the
expectations-based rules of Evans-Honkapohja (2003,
2006).Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
Main ﬁndings
￿ There are many recommended good or “optimal” policies
for this model ...
￿ ... but most produce expectational instability in this setting.
￿ Policymakers following these recommended approaches in
this environment would be surprised to ﬁnd that the
economy does not coordinate on the intended equilibrium.
￿ To obtain expectational stability, use the
expectations-based rules of Evans-Honkapohja (2003,
2006).Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
How to think about E-stability
￿ Stability is not a common mode of analysis in
macroeconomics and monetary policy.
￿ The actual learning dynamics would only be observed in
an unstable situtation.
￿ Otherwise convergence occurs.
￿ We are talking about locally to the REE.
￿ If policy is executed correctly ...
￿ ... observers would see only the REE values of key macro
variables.
￿ Learning would appear to be unimportant, even though it
is enforcing the REE.
￿ One analogy: off-equilibrium play in games.
￿ Another analogy: default punishment in models with
endogenous debt constraints.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
How to think about E-stability
￿ Stability is not a common mode of analysis in
macroeconomics and monetary policy.
￿ The actual learning dynamics would only be observed in
an unstable situtation.
￿ Otherwise convergence occurs.
￿ We are talking about locally to the REE.
￿ If policy is executed correctly ...
￿ ... observers would see only the REE values of key macro
variables.
￿ Learning would appear to be unimportant, even though it
is enforcing the REE.
￿ One analogy: off-equilibrium play in games.
￿ Another analogy: default punishment in models with
endogenous debt constraints.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
How to think about E-stability
￿ Stability is not a common mode of analysis in
macroeconomics and monetary policy.
￿ The actual learning dynamics would only be observed in
an unstable situtation.
￿ Otherwise convergence occurs.
￿ We are talking about locally to the REE.
￿ If policy is executed correctly ...
￿ ... observers would see only the REE values of key macro
variables.
￿ Learning would appear to be unimportant, even though it
is enforcing the REE.
￿ One analogy: off-equilibrium play in games.
￿ Another analogy: default punishment in models with
endogenous debt constraints.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
How to think about E-stability
￿ Stability is not a common mode of analysis in
macroeconomics and monetary policy.
￿ The actual learning dynamics would only be observed in
an unstable situtation.
￿ Otherwise convergence occurs.
￿ We are talking about locally to the REE.
￿ If policy is executed correctly ...
￿ ... observers would see only the REE values of key macro
variables.
￿ Learning would appear to be unimportant, even though it
is enforcing the REE.
￿ One analogy: off-equilibrium play in games.
￿ Another analogy: default punishment in models with
endogenous debt constraints.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
How to think about E-stability
￿ Stability is not a common mode of analysis in
macroeconomics and monetary policy.
￿ The actual learning dynamics would only be observed in
an unstable situtation.
￿ Otherwise convergence occurs.
￿ We are talking about locally to the REE.
￿ If policy is executed correctly ...
￿ ... observers would see only the REE values of key macro
variables.
￿ Learning would appear to be unimportant, even though it
is enforcing the REE.
￿ One analogy: off-equilibrium play in games.
￿ Another analogy: default punishment in models with
endogenous debt constraints.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
How to think about E-stability
￿ Stability is not a common mode of analysis in
macroeconomics and monetary policy.
￿ The actual learning dynamics would only be observed in
an unstable situtation.
￿ Otherwise convergence occurs.
￿ We are talking about locally to the REE.
￿ If policy is executed correctly ...
￿ ... observers would see only the REE values of key macro
variables.
￿ Learning would appear to be unimportant, even though it
is enforcing the REE.
￿ One analogy: off-equilibrium play in games.
￿ Another analogy: default punishment in models with
endogenous debt constraints.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
How to think about E-stability
￿ Stability is not a common mode of analysis in
macroeconomics and monetary policy.
￿ The actual learning dynamics would only be observed in
an unstable situtation.
￿ Otherwise convergence occurs.
￿ We are talking about locally to the REE.
￿ If policy is executed correctly ...
￿ ... observers would see only the REE values of key macro
variables.
￿ Learning would appear to be unimportant, even though it
is enforcing the REE.
￿ One analogy: off-equilibrium play in games.
￿ Another analogy: default punishment in models with
endogenous debt constraints.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
How to think about E-stability
￿ Stability is not a common mode of analysis in
macroeconomics and monetary policy.
￿ The actual learning dynamics would only be observed in
an unstable situtation.
￿ Otherwise convergence occurs.
￿ We are talking about locally to the REE.
￿ If policy is executed correctly ...
￿ ... observers would see only the REE values of key macro
variables.
￿ Learning would appear to be unimportant, even though it
is enforcing the REE.
￿ One analogy: off-equilibrium play in games.
￿ Another analogy: default punishment in models with
endogenous debt constraints.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
How to think about E-stability
￿ Stability is not a common mode of analysis in
macroeconomics and monetary policy.
￿ The actual learning dynamics would only be observed in
an unstable situtation.
￿ Otherwise convergence occurs.
￿ We are talking about locally to the REE.
￿ If policy is executed correctly ...
￿ ... observers would see only the REE values of key macro
variables.
￿ Learning would appear to be unimportant, even though it
is enforcing the REE.
￿ One analogy: off-equilibrium play in games.
￿ Another analogy: default punishment in models with
endogenous debt constraints.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
Expectational instability
￿ Some might worry that the unstable case is “not really
observed.”
￿ Indeed, we would not expect to see a lot of these cases ...
￿ ... policymakers would have to abandon their policies.
￿ But consider Figure 2 in the paper.
￿ Inﬂation and the output gap behave as if the REE has been
attained for many periods.
￿ But eventually, expectational errors accumulate and drive
the economy away from the targeted equilibrium.
￿ Does it happen?
￿ Consider the breakdown of Bretton Woods.
￿ And maybe we should worry about Sweden, as we will see
below.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
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Taylor-type rules
￿ Some potential for instability in the calibrated case.
￿ Taylor rule fairs better than some other recommended
rules studied later in the paper.
￿ Instability requires the combination of operational rules
with constant gain learning.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
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Duffy and Xiao
￿ The Duffy/Xiao rule is a Taylor-type rule.
￿ It represents optimal policy under discretion if the
policymaker has a preference for interest rate smoothing.
￿ Results for commitment case similar.








￿ Produces determinacy if αi sufﬁciently large.
￿ Produces expectational instability if αi sufﬁciently small.
￿ Similar results for Duffy/Xiao under commitment.
￿ Worrisome.
￿ The expectations-based approach of Evans and
Honkapohja solves this problem and provides robust
expectational stability.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
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expectational stability.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
Commitment
￿ No interest rate smoothing, timeless perspective, goal is to
implement the FOC.
￿ Svensson and Woodford (2005) recommended rule
equation (18) in the paper.
￿ Operational versions can be associated with instability
under learning for reasonable gain parameters.
￿ Worrisome for Sweden? Figure 2?
￿ There is nothing optimal about instability.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
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Woodford NRE
￿ Woodford (2008) has considered an alternative approach to
checking the robustness of policy to the possibility that
expectations may not be fully rational.
￿ Avoids committing to a particular recursive algorithm to
describe learning.
￿ But, expectational stability still plays a role in that analysis.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
Woodford NRE
￿ Woodford (2008) has considered an alternative approach to
checking the robustness of policy to the possibility that
expectations may not be fully rational.
￿ Avoids committing to a particular recursive algorithm to
describe learning.
￿ But, expectational stability still plays a role in that analysis.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
Woodford NRE
￿ Woodford (2008) has considered an alternative approach to
checking the robustness of policy to the possibility that
expectations may not be fully rational.
￿ Avoids committing to a particular recursive algorithm to
describe learning.
￿ But, expectational stability still plays a role in that analysis.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
Bayesian approaches
￿ Many feel that recursive learning should be Bayesian.
￿ Bullard and Suda (2008).
￿ Standard recursive learning exercise, but replace classical
econometricians with Bayesian econometricians.
￿ Main results still hold:
￿ “extra” term in the actual law of motion.
￿ expectational stability conditions unchanged.
￿ Stability still an issue.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
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Responding to expectations
￿ Policymakers seem to do this at times ...
￿ but it is not that clear how to map this idea into reality.
￿ Measurement issues.
￿ Potential games.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
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Final thoughts
￿ Very nice paper in a very nice conference.
￿ Thanks to the Bank of Japan for inviting me to participate.
￿ I appreciate the attention to stability issues, which I think
are insufﬁciently analyzed in macroeconomics.
￿ Instability can produce the “big ticket losses” that
policymakers really worry about.Main ideas What the authors do Interpretations Unstable is not optimal Other analyses Why worry
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